Ensuring budgetary disciplines in stage three of EMU (note for the Monetary Committee). II/409/96-EN, 19 July 1996 by unknown
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 
Brussels, 19 July 1996 
II/409/96-EN 
ENSURING BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
IN STAGE THREE OF EMU 
(Note for the Monetary Committee) - 2-
CONTENTS 
SUMMARY 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
2.  THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK 
2.1  Budgetary policy in EMU: flexibility and coordination 
2.2  Medium-term national budgetary targets 
2.3  General approach to ensuring budgetary stability in EMU 
3.  STRENGTHENED SURVEILLANCE AND COORDINATION OF 
BUDGETARY POSITIONS 
3. 1  The legal base 
3.2  National stability programmes 
3. 3  Community procedures 
Box:  MAIN ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED SECONDARY LEGISLATION 












OF BUDGETARY POSITIONS  13 
4.  EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
4.1  Background and underlying approach 
4. 2  Clarification of  the interpretation of  Treaty provisions 
4.3  Establishment of  deadlines in the excessive deficit procedure 
4.4  Sanctions 
4.4.1 Treaty provisions and general principles 
4.4.2 Implementing sanctions 
4. 5  The legal base 
Box:  MAIN ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED SECONDARY LEGISLATION 









PROCEDURE AND TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS  26 
Annexes: 
1.  HOW THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE COULD WORK 
IN STAGE 3 
2.  THE STEPS OF THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE SECONDARY LEGISLATION - 3-- 5-
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Madrid European Council  in  December 1995  stressed  the  crucial  significance  of 
budgetary discipline and noted the Commission's intention "to present its conclusions on 
ways to ensure budgetary discipline and coordination in the monetary union. .. ".  On the 
basis of input from the Commission and the Monetary Committee, the informal Ecofin 
Council, meeting in Verona in April 1996, discussed the issue. Progress reports, covering 
this  theme  inter alia,  were  sent  by  the  Commission  and  the  Ecofin  Council  to  the 
European Council in Florence in June 1996. 
In the approach to the problem taken in this note, it is considered important that any new 
arrangements should be based on the following principles: 
•  they should be achieved in the context of  the Treaty; 
•  the requirements for participation in EMU (either in the first group or at a later date) 
should in no way be changed; 
@  they should be agreed at EU level,  even though full  application would only concern 
the Member States participating in the single currency. 
The approach put forward in this note respects these principles. Budgetary discipline and 
coordination can be enhanced in stage three of EMU through creating a framework in 
which clear medium-term objectives are set and by strengthening the application of  two 
of the  procedures  already  existing  in  the  Treaty  - multilateral  surveillance  and  the 
excessive  deficit  procedure.  The  possibilities  offered  by  the  Treaty  can  be  used 
effectively in the pursuit of  appropriate budgetary policies, but this will also depend on a 
commitment from  all  the parties involved  - the Member States, the Council  and  the 
Commission - to apply procedures rigorously. 
The suggestions in this note take into account the discussion which has taken place so far 
and, by putting forward concrete preferred choices from a range of possible options for 
some of  the detailed and technical features, are intended to advance the debate and build 
upon the emerging consensus. In particular, this note serves as a basis for input on this 
matter to the informal Ecofin Council to be held in September in Dublin. In the Autumn 
the Commission will  finalise  its position and  present formal  proposals to the Council, 
European Parliament and, where appropriate, the EMI. -6-
2e  THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Budgetary policy in EMU: flexibility and coordination 
The introduction of a  single  currency  and  the  creation  of a  European  Central  Bank 
implies that a single monetary policy is set for EMU as a whole. Budgetary policy, which 
remains under the responsibility of  national authorities, will have a more important role in 
macroeconomic stabilisation and in the event of  shocks. 
In order to perform a  shock-absorption and  stabilisation function  at  national  level,  a 
degree  of flexibility  has  to be  left  to national  budgets  in  order to  let  the  automatic 
stabilisers work through the cycle  and  to allow  discretionary measures  in  the case of 
shocks.  A  sound  budgetary  discipline  is  paramount  in  order to  allow  the  necessary 
flexibility  to  cope  with  adverse  economic  circumstances  without  shifting  the  public 
finances onto an unsustainable course. The dual requirement of  discipline and flexibility is 
clearly  recognised  by  the  Treaty  which,  whilst  leaving  budgetary  policy  under  the 
responsibility of  Member States, sets Community rules to avoid excessive public deficits. 
Furthermore,  national budgetary policies should together achieve  an appropriate fiscal 
stance for EMU as  a whole so  as to ease the burden on the single monetary policy in 
preserving  price  stability  at relatively  low  interest  rates  and  thereby  foster  economic 
growth and employment. To achieve this, fiscal discipline should be supplemented by the 
appropriate coordination of national budgetary policies, within the procedures foreseen 
by  Article 103  of the  Treaty.  Further work  will  be  necessary  in  order to  make  this 
coordination operational. 
2.2 Medium-term national budgetary targets 
The 3% of GDP reference value is to be seen as  an upper limit,  except for the limited 
degree of flexibility  stipulated by the Treaty in  Article 1  04c.  Therefore,  in  the medium 
term,  the Member  States should  aim  at  a budgetary position under normal  economic 
circumstances  well  below  that  value.  A  medium-term  target  for  budgetary  policy  is 
important  to  provide guidance  to  markets  and  to orientate the adjustment  efforts  of 
policy  makers.  Whilst  a  single  target  across  EMU  members  would  have  the  clear 
advantage of simplicity and visibility, it is also characterised by a number of drawbacks. -7-
In particular, in view of  differing degrees of  real convergence and demographic prospects 
amongst  Member  States,  national  budgetary  policies  face  different  medium-term 
constraints.  Furthermore, the budgetary room for manoeuvre needed to accommodate 
cyclical  developments  varies  across  Member  States;  in  particular,  it  is  higher  than 
average in smaller countries. 
On  the  basis  of the  considerations  above,  it  is  suggested  to  retain  a  medium-term 
budgetary objective of close to balance,  as  in  the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, 
whilst  allowing  a certain degree of differentiation  in  national  medium-term budgetary 
targets to take into account national specificities. 
2.3 General approach to ensuring budgetary stability in EMU 
The  specific  proposals  for  secondary  legislation  to  strengthen  budgetary  discipline 
considered in this note fall into two parts: 
•  strengthening of  budgetary aspects of  multilateral surveillance; 
•  a clarification of the way the provisions  of the excessive  deficit  procedure will  be 
applied,  in  particular with  regard  to achieving  speedy  implementation  and  greater 
certainty about the nature of  the sanctions to be applied. 
The move  into  stage three implies  a need  for  a reinforced  and  speedier exchange  of 
information  about Member  States'  budgetary  positions  and  intentions  and  a  stronger 
interaction between policy-making at Member State level and the EU level.  This will be 
desirable for both budgetary discipline and policy coordination purposes. 
Building  on the existing  experience with convergence programmes,  it is  suggested to 
specify  more  clearly  (in  secondary  legislation)  the obligations  on Member States,  the 
Commission and the Council, and the procedures to be followed.  The approach is thus 
first to strengthen the budgetary aspects of the multilateral surveillance process so that 
appropriate warnings (
11yellow cards") and  recommendations  can be made to Member 
States before they breach the 3% of  GDP deficit limit and so that more attention can be 
given to achieving an appropriate budgetary stance for the EU and  the single currency 
zone as a whole. 
In the event that Member States did breach the 3% of GDP limit,  or risk doing so, then 
the full  force of the excessive deficit procedure would be brought into play,  leading to 
Council  decisions  and  recommendations,  and  the  imposition  of sanctions  if adequate 
corrective action has not been taken by the Member States concerned; all this needs to be 
carried out expeditiously and in a predictable way so that the excessive deficit procedure 
has  genuine deterrent value.  To this end  the interpretation of the deficit  criterion,  the 
delays between the successive steps of  the procedure, and the nature of  the sanctions and 
their  application  should  be  defined  more  clearly  and  tightly.  However,  it  would  be 
incompatible with the Treaty to seek to override the basic provisions of the excessive 
deficit procedure in  the Treaty;  some  discretion must be retained  and  Member  States 
should have a minimum period at each key step of the procedure to correct their gross 
errors. - 8-
While the procedures foreseen by the Treaty cannot be made fully automatic, agreement 
is  required  not  just  on  specific  aspects  of secondary  legislation  to  clarify  Treaty 
procedures but also on rigorous and timely application of  these procedures so that there 
is  no  doubt  about  the  firm  commitment  of all  those  involved  to  respect  budgetary 
discipline. -9  = 
3.  STRENGTHENED  SURVEILLANCE  AND  COORDINATION  OF 
BUDGETARY POSITIONS 
3.1 The legal base 
Article 1  03 (  5) allows the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 189c,  to  "adopt detailed rules for the  multilateral surveillance procedure  ... ". 
This note suggests that secondary legislation be enacted according to this provision to 
strengthen  the  budgetary  aspects  of multilateral  surveillance.  This  legislation  would 
specify information about budgetary policy objectives, measures and developments to be 
forwarded by Member States to the Commission (see Article 103(3), second indent) and 
would specify more fully the procedures to be followed by the Commission and Council 
in  the monitoring and  assessment  of budgetary policies,  as  part of the regular overall 
assessment required by Article 1  03(3), first indent. 
The  legislation  would  also  specify  situations  in  which  the  Council  might  make 
recommendations to Member States and decide to make those recommendations public, 
as  provided  for  by  Article 103(4),  first  indent.  This  secondary  legislation  would  be 
applicable to all Member States. 
3.2 National stability programmes 
A  strengthened  multilateral  surveillance  aims  at  creating  an  early  warning  system  to 
prevent Member States from  drifting  into  an  excessive  deficit  position.  It would  also 
provide  the  framework  for  budgetary  coordination  with  a  view  to  establishing  the 
appropriate  budgetary  stance  for  EMU as  a  whole.  The  suggested  legislation  would 
create an obligation for Member States to submit programmes covering their budgetary 
policies and would specify some elements to be respected as regards contents and timing. 
Programmes to be submitted by Member States participating in EMU would be called 
"stability  programmes";  programmes  to  be  submitted  by  Member  States  with  a - 10-
derogation would be called "convergence programmes". The suggested legislation draws 
on the valuable experience gained in recent years with convergence programmes1.  The 
voluntary basis for  convergence programmes has  worked reasonably well,  but not all 
Member States have regularly submitted and updated programmes, and so there has not 
in all cases been a comparable standard against which to judge performance. 
The  legislation  would  state  the  information  which  would  have  to  be  included  in 
programmes.  The programme is  to specify  the medium-term objective for the general 
government financial  balance,  the planned adjustment path for the government balance 
and the implied path for the debt ratio.  Main economic assumptions (about economic 
growth and employment/unemployment, inflation and interest rates) are to be described 
so that the conditions in which budgetary policy operates can be understood. Budgetary 
measures  recently  introduced  and  proposed  would  also  have  to be  described  in  the 
programmes.  Commitments  to  take  the  necessary  additional  measures  to  keep  the 
programmes on track would also be asked for. 
It is  suggested to set a minimum time period to be covered by the information about 
budgetary objectives and economic assumptions.  The information should be annual and 
cover at least three future  years  as  well  as  the  previous  and  current year.  Thus,  for 
example, a programme submitted in 1998 should contain annual projections up to at least 
the year 2001. If the transition to the targeted medium-term objective takes longer than 
three years, then the programme should be extended as necessary 
There would be a requirement that programmes be submitted before 1 January 1999, i.e. 
before  the  start  of stage  three  of EMU.  It would  further  be  required  that  updated 
versions of programmes be submitted each year.  These updates would be expected to 
review the implementation of the programme,  confirm medium-term objectives,  review 
economic  prospects  and  adjustment  paths  for  deficit  and  debt,  and  describe  new 
measures being taken. It is  suggested that updated programmes be submitted after the 
presentation of annual  budget plans to the national  parliament.  Ideally,  submission at 
Community  level  should  take  place  immediately  after  the  annual  budget  plans;  the 
suggested secondary legislation would set an upper limit of  two months for submission. 
Member States would also be required to make their programmes public in the interests 
of transparency and  so  as to increase public understanding and  market  scrutiny;  most 
Member States will probably wish to present their programme to the national parliament, 
but it is for individual Member States to decide how to make their programmes public. 
The  specification  of the  minimum  contents  of programmes  does  not  exclude  that 
Member States may  usefully include other information relating to budgetary policy  or 
indeed  to  other areas  of economic  policy.  Desirable  (but  not  obligatory)  features  of 
programmes might be further specified in a code of conduct approved by the Council, 
along the lines  of that already  approved  in February 1994 in  relation  to  convergence 
programmes.  Examples  of other elements  which  the  Commission  services  consider  it 
would be desirable for stability programmes to cover but for which no legal obligation is 
suggested,  include:  intentions  for  expenditure  and  revenue  ratios;  main  categories  of 
expenditure  (e.g.  investment,  interest  payments,  non-interest  current  expenditure); 
1  There was an obligation from Article 109e(2)(a), second indent, to submit, if  necessary,  multiannual 
programmes before the beginning of  the second stage of  EMU on 1 January 1994. - 11 -
surpluses/  deficits  in the  sub-sectors of general  government.  Furthermore,  it would be 
open  to Member  States  during  the  preparation  of their  programmes  to  consult  the 
Commission informally, with a view to achieving consistency in, for example, underlying 
assumptions about the economic environment in the EU and other aspects of  content and 
presentation. 
3.3 Community procedures 
The  suggested  secondary  legislation  would  also  specify  how  some  aspects  of the 
surveillance  of budgetary  policies  are  to  be  carried  out  as  part  of the  multilateral 
surveillance procedure of Article 103(3),  first  indent.  This  would in  no  way limit  the 
scope of  multilateral surveillance, which is much wider than budgetary policy alone. 
It  would be made dear how programmes shall be dealt with by the Council. There would 
be a requirement for the Council to complete an examination of  a programme within two 
months  of its  submission,  to  be  based  on  assessments  by  the  Commission  and  the 
Economic and  Financial  Committee.  The  Council  would  be  required  in  particular  to 
examine the appropriateness of  the medium-term budget objective set in the programme, 
the realism of  the economic assumptions underlying the programme, and the adequacy of 
the budgetary measures to achieve the adjustment aimed for.  In endorsing programmes, 
the Council  may  criticise  aspects  of programmes which  it  considers insufficient.  The 
Member State would be expected to take such comments into account at the latest when 
it prepared its next updated programme; in some circumstances it might be possible and 
appropriate for changes to be made during the current national budgetary process  .. 
The procedure would formalise what has  already been broadly the practice in  dealing 
with the existing generation of  convergence programmes. 
A somewhat less formal  procedure would be allowed for updated programmes.  These 
would  in  any  case  be  assessed  by  the  Commission  and  the Economic  and  Financial 
Committee, but would only be examined by the Council if necessary. It is presumed that 
major shifts in the direction of  policy or problems in implementation would justify going 
to the Council. 
As part of  the multilateral surveillance exercises there would be regular monitoring of  the 
implementation of stability programmes,  in  particular with a view to identifying major 
slippages from targets. The overall budgetary position of the EU and EMU should also 
be assessed by the Council as part of  the coordination of  economic policies in multilateral 
surveillance.  The European Parliament  should be  kept  informed  of the  results  of the 
surveillance exercises.  Increased attention will  have to be given to coordination issues 
once stage three of  EMU is under way. 
The  legislation  would  set  out  how  the  possibility  offered  by  Article 103(4),  for  the 
Council to make (public) recommendations to Member States that risk jeopardising the 
proper  functioning  of EMU,  might  be  applied  in  the  context  of the  surveillance  of 
budgetary  policies.  It is  suggested  that  making  a  recommendation  and  making  a 
recommendation  public  should  be  separate  steps  dependent  on the  persistence  of a 
problem. - 12-
As guidance to the Council, it is suggested that a recommendation to a Member State to 
take corrective action would be made, if  a slippage was identified from the medium-term 
budgetary objective (or the planned  adjustment path during a transition period) which 
was clearly greater than the impact of  cyclical factors.  Significant departures from plans, 
which if uncorrected would risk further deterioration in  the budgetary position would 
thus lead to an early initiative from the Council to give a "yellow card" warning. - 13-
MAIN ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED SECONDARY LEGISLATION TO 
STRENGTHEN SURVEILLANCE AND COORDINATION OF 
BUDGETARY POSITIONS 
Stability programmes 
1.  Each participating Member  State shall  submit  to  the  Council  and  Commission  a 
"stability programme".  [Parallel  obligation  on non-participating Member  States to 
submit "convergence programmes".] 
2.  A stability programme shall contain: 
(a)  medium-term objective and adjustment path for the government surplus/deficit 
as a ratio to GDP; path for the government debt ratio; 
(b)  main assumptions about expected economic developments  (real  GDP  growth, 
employment/unemployment, inflation, interest rates); 
(c)  description of budgetary measures being taken to achieve the objectives of  the 
programme; 
(d)  commitment to take additional  measures when  necessary to prevent  slippage 
from targets. 
3.  The information about paths for the government surplus/deficit ratio and debt ratio 
and the main economic assumptions referred to in para 2(  a)  and (b) shall be annual 
and  shall  cover,  as  well  as  the current and  preceding year,  at  least the following 
three years. 
4.  Stability programmes shall be submitted before 1 January 1999.  Thereafter, updated 
programmes  shall  be  submitted  each  year,  not  later  than  two  months  after  the 
presentation  of annual  budget  proposals  by  a  Member  State  government  to  its 
national parliament. 
5.  Member  States  shall  make  public  their  stability  programmes  and  updated 
programmes. 
6.  Other aspects relating to the content  and  format  of stability programmes may  be 
dealt with by a code of  conduct which may be approved by the Council. - 14-
Community  procedures:  assessment  and  monitoring  of  stability  programmes: 
recommendations 
7.  Based  on  assessments  by  the  Commission  and  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Committee, the Council shall endorse each stability programme within at most two 
months of its submission.  The Council shall examine in particular whether, having 
regard  to  specific  national  characteristics,  the  national  medium-term  budget 
objective is  consistent with that of close to balance  set for  the Community  as  a 
whole,  whether the economic  assumptions  on which the programme is  based  are 
realistic  and  whether the measures being taken and/  or proposed are  sufficient  to 
achieve  the  targeted  adjustment  path  towards  the  medium-term  objective.  The 
Council may indicate ways in  which it considers the objectives  and  contents of a 
programme should be strengthened. 
8.  Updated  stability  programmes  shall  be examined  by  the Economic  and  Financial 
Committee on the basis of assessments by the Commission;  if necessary,  updated 
programmes may also be examined by the Council. 
9.  As part of the regular twice-yearly multilateral  surveillance exercises,  the Council 
shall  monitor  the  implementation  of stability  programmes,  based  on information 
provided  by  Member  States  and  on  assessments  by  the  Commission  and  the 
Economic  and  Financial  Committee,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  identifying 
significant actual or expected divergence from  the medium-term objective (or the 
adjustment  path  towards  it)  set  in  the  stability  programme  for  the  government 
surplus/  deficit. 
10.  In the event of  significant identified slippage from the medium-term objective (or the 
adjustment path towards it), which is not explainable by conjunctural weakness, the 
Council  may,  as  provided for by  Article  103 (  4  ),  make  a recommendation to the 
Member State concerned to take budgetary adjustment measures. 
11.  In the event that in subsequent monitoring the slippage from target is seen to persist 
or  worsen,  the  Council  may  make  a  recommendation  to  the  Member  State 
concerned to take specific corrective action and,  as provided for by Article 103(4), 
may make its recommendation public. 
12.  As part of the multilateral  surveillance exercises,  the Council  shall  also  assess the 
appropriatness of  the overall actual and forecast budgetary positions for the area as 
a whole implied by national stability programmes and updated programmes. 
13  The Council and Commission shall report to the European Parliament twice a year 
on the multilateral surveillance. - 15-
4.  EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
4.1  Background and underlying approach 
The importance attached to budgetary stability is  evident from  Article  1  04c(1) which 
states ''Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits". Subsequent provisions 
of Article 1  04c outline the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) to enforce this obligation. 
The Treaty recognises the greater obligation on countries forming part of  the monetary 
union,  and  hence  provides  additional  mechanisms  which  ultimately  could  lead  to the 
imposition of  sanctions. 
The  excessive  deficit  procedure  set  out in  the  Treaty  is  complicated  involving  some 
eleven  separate  steps.  It is  supplemented  with  the  Protocol  on the  excessive  deficit 
procedure,  which inter alia,  defines  the reference values against  which compliance  is 
judged. There also exists Council Regulation 3605/93 on the application of  the Protocol 
on the excessive deficit procedure, which inter alia, specifies the reporting requirements 
of  Member States. 
With  a  view  to  enhancing  budgetary  stability  in  stage  3,  the  Commission  services 
consider that secondary legislation could be adopted on the excessive deficit procedure 
with three objectives in mind:  to clarify the interpretation of certain Treaty provisions -
to accelerate the procedure by fixing  time-limits between successive steps - to provide 
guidance  to  the  Council  on  the  type  and  scale  of sanctions  to  be  imposed.  Such 
legislation will  help  ensure that the excessive deficit  procedure functions  in  a smooth, 
rapid and predictable manner. 
The excessive deficit procedure came into effect at the beginning of stage two of  EMU, 
and  considerable experience and insights have been gained through its application over 
the past three years.  Where  appropriate,  existing  practices and  procedures  should  be 
maintained. In particular, deadlines for the submission of data by the Member States and 
the start of  the excessive deficit procedure should remain unchanged. Currently Member 
States are required to submit data twice annually, by 1 March and by  1 September, and 
the  excessive  deficit  procedure  is  conducted  annually  on  the  basis  of March  data 
(although it could be launched at any time). 
The Council  could  continue to determine the existence of an  excessive deficit  on the 
basis  of actual  data and  not  planned  data alone.  However,  reliance  on  actual  data to 
confirm the existence of an excessive deficit does not delay the start of the procedure. 
On the basis of planned data alone,  or on the basis of forecasts (for example, estimates 
presented by governments when presenting annual budgets) it is possible to complete the - 16-
early steps of  the procedure, up to and including Article 1  04c(  5) where the Commission 
may address an opinion to the Council that there is a risk of  an excessive deficit. 
Concern has been raised that the credibility of the excessive deficit procedure could be 
called into question in cases where there is manifest evidence that a country will breach 
the reference value, but where the Council would be constrained from taking action until 
actual data is available. This could occur if  a Government announced a budget in autumn 
of year t with a forecast deficit of 5%  of GDP in year t+ 1,  but which would only be 
confirmed  by  actual  data  in  March  of  the  following  year,  t+ 2.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  could  begin  immediately  after  the 
Government announcement (year t) leading to a Commission opinion to the Council on 
the risk of an excessive deficit in accordance with  Article 1  04c(  5). However, if during 
the course of year  t+ 1,  further  reliable  information became  available  confirming  this 
eventuality (say in the planned data submissions of March or September for year t+ 1), 
then the Council could consider that an excessive deficit exists in accordance with Article 
104c(6).  The  important  factor  is  that  the  forecast  of a  deficit  alone  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  put  a  country  into  an  excessive  deficit  position:  it  would  have  to  be 
confirmed by additional robust information providing clear evidence that the reference 
value is being exceeded by a considerable margin.  In other words,  a prudent approach 
would be followed  in  the  absence  of actual  data:  there  should  be  no  doubt that the 
outcome will be a deficit clearly above the reference value. - 17-
4.2  Clarification of the interpretation of Treaty provisions 
The  Commission  services  consider  that  three  key  provisions  of Article  1  04c  warrant 
clarification,  although secondary legislation  would  only be  appropriate for  the first  of 
these: 
•  the exceptions on breaching the reference value for  government deficits  set out in 
Article 1  04c(2); 
•  the  conditions under which  the  Commission  will  prepare  a report  to  the  Council 
having identified the risk of an excessive deficit position in accordance with Article 
104c(3); 
•  clarification  as  to  what  constitutes  "effective  action"  m  accordance  with  Article 
104c(8). ~ 18-
Clarify in secondary legislation the exceptions on breaching the reference value for 
government deficits:  the purpose of including  a clarification in  secondary  legislation 
would be to enhance the status of the reference value  as  an  upper limit.  In practice, 
however,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  provide  a  watertight  definition  governing  all 
exceptional situations which is why the Treaty provides room for the Council to exercise 
its judgement. 
The  Commission  services  consider  that  the  term  "exceptional  and  temporary"  in 
Article 104c(2a) 2nd indent could be interpreted as follows.  A breach of the reference 
value could be considered exceptional under two conditions: (1) when resulting from an 
unusual event outside the control of  the relevant Member State and which has a major 
impact on the financial  position  of the general  government;  (2) when resulting  from. 
severe  economic  downturns.  A  breach  of the  reference  value  in  year  t-1  could  be 
considered temporary if planned  data for year  t,  as  defined  in  the Council Regulation 
3605/93, indicate that the deficit will  return below the reference value in the calendar 
year following the year in which the deficit exceeded the reference value. 
Two types of exceptional events are identified above.  Firstly, there are unusual events 
outside  the  control· of the Member  State  and  which  have  a  large  impact  on  public 
finances.  This  includes  natural  disasters  or  other  events  of a  catastrophic  nature. 
Secondly, it refers to severe economic disturbances going beyond the normal downturns 
of the  economic  cycle.  Past  example  of such  economic  disturbances  could  include 
German unification or the collapse of  Finnish export markets in the former USSR. 
The term "temporary" described above refers to a situation where a country breaches the 
reference value in year t-1  but where planned data indicate that  the deficit will return 
below the reference value in year t.  However, should data become available during this 
intervening period which  indicates  otherwise,  the  Council  could act immediately  and 
decide that an excessive deficit situation exists. 
Clarify  the  conditions  under  which  the  Commission  will  prepare  a  report  in 
accordance with Article 1  04c(3): this Article states that the "Commission may prepare 
a report if  .. .  .  .  .  it is of the  opinion  that there  is a  risk of an  excessive  deficit in a 
Member State".  It is  the  responsibility  of the  Commission  to  identify  the  risk  of an 
excessive  deficit,  and  having  done  so,  to decide  whether to forward  a  report to the 
Council. As such, Commission action is required to proceed with successive steps of  the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
As regards what constitutes a risk of an excessive deficit, there is a substantive link with 
the multilateral surveillance procedure of Article  103, even though no formal legal link 
exists.  The  Commission,  in  assessing  risk,  would  clearly  take  account  of 
recommendations issued to a Member State under the multilateral surveillance procedure 
in accordance with Article 103(4), and in particular if those recommendations had been 
made public. Indeed, the purpose of reinforced surveillance is provide early warning of 
significant  slippages  from  medium-term  targets which  could  lead  a  risk  of reference 
values being breached. However, Council recommendations under Article  103(4) could 
not automatically constitute a risk of  an excessive deficit. 
In order to demonstrate its commitment to budgetary stability,  the Commission would 
make a clear statement of  its policy intentions to the effect that having identified the risk - 19-
of an excessive deficit,  the Commission could be  expected to prepare a report to the 
Council in accordance with Article 104c(3). 
It should be borne in mind,  that where the Council or a Member State differs from the 
Commission in its assessment of  the risk of  an excessive deficit, Article 1  09d allows them 
to request the Commission to act in accordance with Article 104c(3). The Commission is 
obliged to examine this request and  submit its conclusions without delay.  Indeed,  this 
rule applies to all provisions of  Article 1  04c with the exception of  paragraph 14. 
Clarification  as  to  what constitutes  "effective  action"  in  accordance  with  Article 
1 04c(8)o
0  the time lag between the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and 
the decision as to whether effective action has been taken determines the overall length 
of  the procedure. There is a trade-off between the speed of  the procedure and legislative 
certainty of corrective budgetary measures.  For example, if the judgement on effective 
action can be made following  an  axamination of measures agreed by the Government 
concerned without waiting for their formal adoption by national legislatures, then a short 
time limit could be envisaged, i.e. the time required to prepare a budgetary package. The 
alternative would be to await formal adoption of  measures before judging whether or not 
they are effective. Depending on national budgetary procedures,  this could take many 
months. 
The Commission services consider that an appropriate balance needs to be struck: on the 
one hand Member  States  should  be  given  sufficient time  to draw up,  and  if possible 
enact, corrective budgetary packages; on the other hand, deadlines should be sufficiently 
short so as to maintain a sense of  urgency. It would be up to the Council, when issuing 
its recommendation in  accordance with Article 1  04c(7),  to state clearly what effective 
action is considered to mean,  i.e.  whether budgetary measures must be enacted by the 
national legislature. A priori, effective action could be judged on the basis of measures 
agreed  by  a  Government,  provided  there was  a  sufficient  degree  of certainty that it 
would  be  endorsed  by  the  national  Parliament.  If  Government  packages  were 
subsequently not enacted within a given time-limit, or if  they are not implemented in full, 
then the Council could reconsider its decision. 
Member  States  should  consider  whether  existing  national  budgetary  procedures  are 
compatible given the enhanced obligations ofEMU. -20-
4.3 Establishment of deadlines in the excessive deficit procedure 
To avoid over-determining the procedure, it is suggested to establish a single time limit 
for the completion of  the early steps of  the procedure, up to and including the issuing of 
a Council recommendation following a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. 
For subsequent  steps  of the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  it  would  be  appropriate  to 
establish individual deadlines. 
As  mentioned  previously,  deadlines  should  represent  a  balance  between the  need  to 
maintain a sense of  urgency and the need to provide sufficient time to Member States to 
take  appropriate  actions.  The  suggested  time  path  is  based  on  the  procedure 
commencing  after the March reporting  deadline.  Moreover,  the  suggested time  limits 
represents maximum delays.  The Council could fix  shorter deadlines where appropriate, 
for example if  the Member State had an early warning under Article 103. 
In determining its maximum time-delays,  the Commission services consider that, to the 
extent possible, the decision on sanctions should be taken in the same calendar year as 
the decision on the existence of  the excessive deficit. For this reason, it is suggested that 
the decision on sanctions be taken no later than nine months after the data submission 
deadlines. 
The following deadlines could be enshrined in secondary legislation: 
•  between the submission of  actual data and the Council decision on the existence 
of  an excessive deficit and the issuance of  Council recommendations. A period of 
three months could be provided from reporting deadline of  Regulation 3605/93 until 
the Council decision on the existence of  an excessive deficit. The Council could issue 
its  recommendations  at the same time.  Based on the  1 March reporting  date,  the 
Council would have to act before 1 June (i.e. the May Ecofin).  This is  considerably - 21  -
faster than current procedures where the decision on the existence of an excessive 
deficit is taken at the June Ecofin Council and recommendations are issued at the July 
Ecofin  Council.  The  proposed  acceleration  would  be  feasible  if a  number  of 
conditions  are  respected:  a  small  number  of countries  have  an  excessive  deficit; 
Member States strictly respect the 1 March deadline for the submission of data; the 
Commission and the (future) Economic and Financial Committee are prepared to act 
swiftly. 
f!J  between  the issuance of Council recommendations  and the  assessment  as  to 
whether effective action has been taken: as mentioned above,  this is  the decisive 
step in ensuring a rapid procedure. An upper limit of  four months is suggested which 
would imply that Council would have to confirm that no  effective action has been 
taken before 1 October (i.e. the September Ecofin) based on a recommendation from 
the Commission. This should provide sufficient time to develop (and in many cases 
adopt)  substantial  budgetary  packages  and  would  also  be  convenient  as  several 
Member States draw up national budget plans in late summer and early autumn. 
e  between the Council's assessment as to  whether effective action has been taken 
and the giving of  notice to  the Member State concerned:  a  one month deadline 
would imply that this step be taken no later than 1 November, i.e. the October Ecofin 
Council. 
e  between  the  Council giving of notice  to  the Member State  and the  Council 
decision whether to impose sanctions : A two months deadline would imply that the 
decision on sanctions be taken by the end of the calendar year,  i.e.  the December 
Ecofin Council. 
(I»  between the Council decision to impose sanctions and the decision to intensifY or 
abrogate sanctions: in general, the Council would base its decision on March data. 
Assuming sanctions were imposed in December (year t),  this would imply that the 
first  opportunity to intensify or abrogate sanctions would arise some three to four 
months later (March or April of  year t+ 1). 4.4. Sanctions 
4A.l Treaty provisions and general principles 
Sanctions serve as a measure of  last resort imposed on those Member States which have 
failed  to put into  practice  or which  have  ignored  successive  recommendations of the 
Council  to implement  effective  actions  to correct  an  excessive  deficit.  Four types  of 
sanctions are envisaged in Article 1  04c(ll) of  the Treaty: to require the Member State to 
publish additional information before issuing public debt; invite the European Investment 
Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State concerned; require the 
Member State to make  a non-interest-bearing  deposit;  impose fines  of an  appropriate 
size. 
According to the Treaty, the Council retains discretion on the appropriateness of and on 
the type of  sanctions, within the range of  possibilities envisaged by the Treaty. However, 
in order to make the present commitment to budgetary discipline  credible,  there is  the 
presumption that failure  to comply  with the  request  of the  Council  to take  effective 
measures to correct the excessive  deficit will  lead  to sanctions being  imposed  on the 
Member State concerned. 
In the Progress report to the European Summit in Florence, the Ecofin Council  states 
that there is a presumption that, "after having decided that an excessive deficit persists, 
the Council will impose sanctions on a prescribed scale - the  objective being to create 
clear expectations of  fines sufficient to  have deterrent effect".  The Commission,  in its 
communication to the European Council, stated that "secondary legislation, adopted on -23-
the basis of  Article 104c(J4), could ...  clarify the conditions under which sanctions will 
be imposed and define the type, scale and timing of  sanctions". 
Adequate sanctions in the context of  the excessive-deficit procedure should, in principle: 
•  have a pre-emptive deterrent impact,  i.e.  those authorities which are threatened by 
potential sanctions should have an incentive to avoid an excessive deficit in the first 
place; 
•  have the necessary degree of certainty and ease of computation, so that the Member 
State  concerned  would  know  what  penalties  it  would  incur,  in  the  various 
circumstances, if  it persists in not correcting the deficit; 
•  be credible, i.e. be expected to be really applied on Member States failing to correct 
the  deficit;  to this  end,  the  credibility  of very  tough  sanctions  would  be put into 
question during the first years of  EMU when some members are still likely to be close 
to the 3% deficit limit; 
•  contribute to the adjustment process and  not risk unduly aggravating the economic 
and  budgetary  situation  of the  country  in  question;  in  this  sense,  sanctions  must 
respect the proportionality principle established in Article 3b of  the Treaty; 
•  be timely,  by  limiting  as  far  as  possible  the  delay  between  the  occurrence  of an 
excessive deficit and the potential application of sanctions, so as to give an incentive 
to correct the deficit immediately. 
These principles should provide guidance in assessing the type of sanctions provided for 
by the Treaty and devising the mechanism of  concrete application. 
4.4o2 Implementing sanctions 
This paper suggests that, whenever sanctions are triggered, the Council will,  as a rule, 
impose non-interest-bearing deposits.  The amount of these deposits could consist of a 
constant term (expressed as  a share of GDP)  and  a variable term proportional to the 
deviation of  the budget deficit from the 3% of  GDP reference value2. 
In the case in which an excessive deficit is due to a rising stock of  debt, even though the 
deficit remains below 3% ofGDP3, the deposit would be equal to the constant term. 
The above approach  has a number of  advantages: 
•  the  constant  amount  shows  clearly  that  there  exists  a  clearly  different  position 
between having or not having an excessive deficit; 
2  Deposits would be calculated according to the following expression: 
S1 =a+ b(dt-1- 3%) 
where S1 is the sanction applied in year t and dt-1  is the budget deficit of the previous year (i.e. the 
year in which the deficit was considered to be excessive), both as a share of GDP. The terms a and b 
are constant, appropriately chosen. 
3  This may occur ifboth the rate of growth of  nominal GDP is very low and the stock of  debt is not far 
higher than the 60% of  GDP reference value or in case of  high and recurrent stock-flow adjustment. -24-
•  the constant amount should provide a powerful incentive for a country being close to 
the reference value to make the necessary effort to put the deficit under control or to 
correct it; 
•  the  proportional,  linear  part  of the  sanction  would  penalise/reward  budgetary 
behaviour in a continuous fashion;  it would avoid  discrete jumps in  sanctions,  and 
thus  discourage  a  clustering  of budget  deficits  just  below  "round  figures"  (full 
percentage points of  GDP), above which sanctions would be stepped up. 
The  fixed  component could  be  of the  order of 0.2%  of GDP  and  the  coefficient  of 
proportionality could be  set at 0  .1.  These values,  which appear to  satisfy the general 
principles of credibility, proportionality and deterrence, imply that failing to correct the 
excessive deficit  entails a penalty which is  equal to 0.2%  of GDP  plus  a tenth of the 
difference between the actual deficit and the reference value4. 
The initial deposit should tum into a fine if  within two years the excessive deficit has not 
yet been corrected or effective actions have not been taken. According to this approach, 
after the first  two .  years and  until  the  excessive  deficit  is  re-absorbed,  the procedure 
works de facto on an yearly basis as each year the deposit made two years earlier would 
become a fine. 
An upper limit on the annual amount of deposits of  the order of  0. 5% of GDP could be 
envisaged.  This would prevent sanctions from becoming unbearable and thereby being 
counter-productive.  In case of the  above-mentioned values  of the  components of the 
sanctions rule, this figure corresponds to the amount of sanctions triggered by a budget 
deficit  of 6%  of GDP.  Hence,  any  deficit  above  this  level  would  not  carry  a 
proportionally higher sanction. 
The deposits will be lodged with the Commission. Interests on the deposits and proceeds 
of  fines will be transferred to the EU budget. 
The  Council  may  decide  to  supplement  the  initial  or  subsequent  deposit  with  the 
sanctions mentioned in Article 104c(11), first and second indent, in  order to strengthen 
the  punitive  character of its  decision.  Contrary to the  abrogation  of deposits,  which, 
according ·to  the  Treaty,  can  only  take  place  once  the  excessive·  deficit  has  been 
corrected, these non-pecuniary sanctions could be lifted, on the basis of  the provisions of 
Article 1  04c(12), in case of  good, though still partial progress in re-absorbing the deficit. 
According to the time  schedule  envisaged in  section 4.3  for  the various  steps of the 
excessive deficit procedure, the first application of sanctions would take place no later 
than December of  the year following that in which the excessive deficit arose. Thereafter, 
sanctions would be reviewed once a year or, as to the transformation of deposits into a 
fine,  once every two years,  following the March reporting by the Member States.  The 
amount of  deposits could be adapted technically later on in the year as revised figures for 
the deficit become available. 
4  Hence, a Member State having an excessive budget deficit of  5% of GDP would be hit by a pecuniary 
sanction in the form of  a deposit equal to 0.4% ofGDP. -25-
4.5  Legal base 
As  regards the legal base,  secondary legislation could be adopted  in  accordance with 
Article 104c(14)  either by  replacing  the Protocol (2nd  subparagraph)  or by  adopting 
detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provisions of the Protocol (3 rd 
subparagraph).  The latter involve complementing Regulation 3605/93,  OJ L  332/7  of 
31.12.93. Under both provisions,  the Council  acts in its full  composition of all  fifteen 
Member States, even though the specific procedural requirements differ. 5 
According  to  Article  104c(l4)  1st  subparagraph,  the  Protocol  contains  "further 
provisions relating to  the  implementation of  the procedure described in this Article". 
The potential scope of  the Protocol is therefore larger than what is set out in the present 
Protocol.  Secondary legislation would take the form  of a Regulation which would not 
have to ratified by the Member States.  Amending this new Regulation would  require 
unanimity. 
Whereas the 2nd subparagraph is open to wide interpretation, the 3rd subparagraph has a 
narrower scope. It is limited to the "detailed rules and definitions for the application of 
the provisions of  the said Protocol", i.e.  for the application of  the provisions relating to 
the implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure. 
Given  that  possible  secondary  legislation  identified  in  this  text  mainly  refers  to  the 
application of  Treaty provisions rather than to rules and provisions for application of  the 
Protocol,  there  is  a  strong  possibility,  that  Article  104c(l4)  2nd  subparagraph  will 
provide the legal base.  Formal confirmation of this must await the availability of draft 
legal text. 
The replacement of  the Protocol would require that existing provisions are copied into a 
new  Regulation.  The  Commission  services  are  of the  view  that  existing  Protocol 
provisions  from  part  of the  acquis  communautaire  and  should  not  be  ammended. 
Otherwise, there is a risk of introducing damaging uncertainty in the progress towards 
EMU. 
5  To replace the Protocol under the 2nd subparagraph, the Council acts unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank. To 
adopt detailed rules and definitions for the application of  the provisions of  the Protocol under the 3rd 
subparagraph, the Council acts by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank. -26-
MAIN ELEMENTS OF SUGGESTED SECONDARY LEGISLATION TO 
CLARIFY AND SPEED UP THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE AND TO 
IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS 
Clarification of  the interpretation of  Treaty provisions 
1.  The  term  "exceptional  and  temporary"  in  Article  104c(2a)  2nd  indent  could  be 
interpreted as follows: 
- breach of the  reference  value  could  be  considered  exceptional  when  resulting 
from  an  unusual  event  outside the control of the  relevant  Member  State and 
which has  a major impact on the financial  position of the general government. 
Severe economic downturns could also constitute exceptional situations;. 
- breach of  the reference value in year t-1 could be considered temporary if  planned 
· data for year t,  as defined in the Council Regulation 3605/93, indicate that the 
deficit will  return below the reference value in the calendar year following  the 
year in which the deficit exceeded the reference value. 
Establishment of  deadlines 
2.  The Council shall decide on the existence of  an excessive deficit in accordance with 
Article  1  04c(  6),  within three  months  of the  reporting  dates  pursuant to  Council 
Regulation  EC/3605/93  of  22  November  1993.  The  Council  shall  issue 
recommendations  to  the  Member  State  concerned  in  accordance  with  Article 
1  04c(7) immediately following the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in accordance with Article 1  04c(  6). 
3.  Any  Council decision that no  effective action has  been taken in  accordance with 
Article 104c(8), shall be taken within four months of  the decision on the existence of 
an  excessive  deficit  in  accordance  with  Article  1  04c(  6)  and  the  issuing  of 
recommendations in accordance with Article 1  04c(7). 
4.  Any Council decision to give notice to the Member State to take  measures for the 
deficit reduction in accordance with Article 1  04c(9), shall be taken within one month 
of a Council decision that no  effective  action has been taken in  accordance with 
Article 104c(8). 
5.  Where the conditions to apply Article 104c(11) are met, there is a presumption that 
the Council will decide to impose sanctions in accordance with Article 1  04c(  11) no 
later than two months after the Council decision to give notice to the Member State 
to take measures in accordance with Article 1  04c(9). 
6.  Any Council decision to intensify sanctions in accordance with Article  104c(11) or 
to abrogate some or all of  its decisions in accordance with Article 104c(12) shall be 
taken  no  later  than  two  months  after  the  reporting  dates  pursuant  to  Council 
Regulation EC/3605/93 of22 November 1993. -27  = 
Type and scale of  sanctions 
7.  Whenever the Council  decides to apply sanctions to a Member State in  excessive 
deficit which has failed to take measures to correct it,  a non-interest-bearing deposit 
would, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement this deposit by 
the measures foreseen in the first and second indent of  Article 104c(11). 
8.  The amount of the deposit could  comprise of a fixed  component (expressed  as  a 
share of GDP) and a variable component proportional to the difference between the 
deficit as a percentage of  GDP of  the year in which such deficit was considered to be 
excessive and the 3% ofGDP reference value. An upper limit of0.5% ofGDP could 
be set for the annual amount of  deposits. 
Intensification and abrogation of  sanctions 
9.  The initial deposit will,  as a rule, tum into a fine if within the two subsequent years 
the excessive deficit has, in the view of  the Council, not been corrected. The Council 
may. decide to supplement this fine by the measures foreseen in the first and second 
indent  of Article 1  04c(11)  if the  latter  had  not  been  applied  at the  moment  of 
imposing sanctions. At the same time the Member State should be required to make a 
new non-interest-bearing deposit calculated according to the rule set out in 8. 
10. The Council may decide to abrogate some or all the sanctions defined in the first and 
second  indent  of art.  1  04c( 11)  to  the  extent  that  the  Member  State  is  making 
significant, though not yet sufficient progress in correcting the excessive deficit. 
11. The Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if, in the view of  the Council, the 
excessive deficit has been corrected. 
Proceeds of  sanctions 
12. The  deposits  will  be  lodged with the  Commission.  Interests  on the deposits  and 
proceeds of  fines will be transferred to the EU budget. Annex 1 
HOW THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE COULD WORK IN STAGE 3 
by  1  March:  submission  of data  by  Member  States  in  accordance  with  Regulation 
3605/93. 
by end  March: Commission prepares report in accordance with Article 1  04c(3). 
early/mid April: Economic and Financial Committee prepares opinion in accordance with 
Article 1  04c (  4). 
by end April: adoption of Commission opinion in  accordance with Article 1  04c(  5)  and 
prepares its recommendation to the Council in accordance with Article 1  04c(  6). 
May:  Council  decision  on  the  existence  of an  excessive  deficit  in  accordance  with 
Article 104c(6). 
May: Council recommendation to the Member State in accordance with Article 1  04c(7). 
September: Council decision that no effective action has been taken and decision on the 
publication of  recommendations in accordance with Article 1  04c(8). 
October: Council decision to give notice to take measures within a specified time-limit in 
accordance with Article 104c(9). 
December: Council decision to impose sanctions in accordance with Article 104c(ll). 
March: Council decision to intensify sanctions in accordance with Article 1  04c(ll) or to 
abrogate sanctions in accordance with Article 104c(12). 
The scenario described above would occur when a country moves into an excessive deficit 
position unexpectedly without early warning. It is therefore necessary to commence the 
procedure from the beginning in 1 March. Nevertheless, the procedure is very rapid, with 
only three months required to determine an  excessive deficit position possibly leading to 
sanctions within nine months. 
The deadlines  presented above  should  be regarded as  maximum  time  delays,  with the 
Council having discretion to set tighter time-limits  An acceleration would  be feasible if 
there had been advance warning of the risk of an excessive deficit.  Take the case of a 
Member  State  which  had  been  issued  with  a  recommendation  in  accordance  with 
Article 103(4). If  the Commission considered that there is a risk of  an excessive deficit, it 
would prepare a report to the Council in  accordance with Article  104c(3).  The Council 
could immediately determine the existence of an  excessive  deficit in March once actual 
data is available thus gaining three to four months compared with the scenario described 
above. In other words, it could be possible to decide on sanctions by October. How the excessive defict procedure would work beginning in March 
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The steps of the excessive deficit procedure and suggestions for possible secondary legislation 
Commission 
monitoring 
Art  104c(2)  and I  The  Co~s~io~ shall  in  p~cular  e?'~ne compliance  with I  Clarify ~e  interpretation of the terms 
Art  1  Protocol  budgetary disctphne on the bas1s of  two cntena;  "exceptional and temporary" 
No.5 
Commission  1 Art 1  04c(3) 
report 
Report of  the  I Art. 1  04c(  4) 
Econ. & Finan. 
Committee 
•  whether  the  ratio  of the  planned  or  actual  deficit  to  gross 
domestic product at market value exceeds 3 %, unless: 
- either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously 
and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; 
- or alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only 
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the 
reference value. 
•  whether the ratio of  govt. debt to gross domestic product exceeds 
60 % , unless: 
- the  ratio  is  sufficiently  diminishing  and  approaching  the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
If  a Member State does  not fulfil the requirements or if there is a  Clarify (not in secondary legislation) 
corresponding risk,  the Commission shall prepare a report,  which  the  conditions  under  which  the 
shall also  take account of all other relevant factors,  including the  Commission will prepare a report. 
medium-term economic and budgetary position. 
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If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member 
State exists or may occur, the Commission shall address an opinion 
to the Council 
The  Council  shall,  acting  on  a  recommendation  from  the  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  3 
Commission  and  having  considered  any  observation  which  the  months  after  the  deadlines  for  the 
Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall  submission of  data 
assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. 
The  Council  shall  make  recommendations  to  the  Member  State  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  3 
concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a  months  after  the  deadlines  for  the 
given period  submission of  data. 
Where the Council establishes that there has been no effective action  Clarify (not in secondary legislation) 
in response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the  what constitute "effective action". 
Council may make its recommendations public  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  4 
months  after  the  decision  on  the 
existence of  an excessive deficit. 
If  a  Member  State  persists  in  failing  to  implement  the  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  1 
recommendation,  the  Council  may  decide  to  give  notice  to  the  month  after  the  decision  that  no 
Member State to take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the  effective action has been taken. 
deficit reduction. 
The Council may also request the Member State concerned to submit 
reports in accordance with a specific timetable in order to examine 
the adjustment efforts of  that Member State. - 3 -
9  Council  Art 1  04c( 11)  If a Member  State  fails  to  comply with a decision of para.  9,  the  Establish deadline:  no later that two 
Decision to  Council may::  months  after  the  decision  to  give 
apply  notice to a Member State. 
sanction(s)  •  require the Member State to publish additional information, to 
be specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and securities; 
•  invite  the  EIB  to  reconsider  its  lending  policy  towards  the 
Member State concerned; 
•  require the  Member  State  concerned to  make  a  non-interest-
bearing deposit of an appropriate size with the Community until 
the  excessive  deficit  has,  in the  view  of the  Council,  been 
corrected; 
•  impose fines of  an appropriate size  . 
10  Council  Art 104c(ll)  As long as a Member State fails to comply with a decision according  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  2 
decision to  to para. 9 the Council may decide to intensify the measures.  months after be reporting deadlines of 
intensify the  Regulation 3605/93. 
sanction(s) 
i 
11  Abrogation of  Art 104c(l2)  The Council shall abrogate some or all of its decisions referred to in  Establish  deadline:  no  later  than  2 ' 
the Council  para. 6 to  9 and 11  to the extent that the excessive deficit in the  months after be reporting deadlines of 
decisions  Member  State  has  previously,  in the  view  of the  Council,  been  Regulation 3605/93. 
corrected: 